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Kosovo: Statebuilding Utopia and Reality
David Chandler, University of Westminster
Abstract
Twenty years of international statebuilding have seemingly made little impact 
on the ‘stateness’ of Kosovo. Rather than tracing the intricacies of policy-
making in Kosovo itself, covered elsewhere in this Special Issue, this article 
considers the changes in the understanding of the statebuilding project itself. 
The article traces the shift from the liberal internationalist assumptions of the 
late 1990s to the pragmatic realism of today. It does this through the lenses of 
E H Carr’s classic work The Twenty Years’ Crisis, UN policy thinking on the 
problematic assumptions of international statebuilding and the diagnoses in 
David Lake’s 2016 book The Statebuilder’s Dilemma, which sets out three 
pragmatic alternatives. The article concludes that all three of these 
alternatives can be seen in practice in Kosovo.
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Introduction
The installation of an international protectorate in Kosovo, in 1999, marked 
the highpoint of confidence in the international statebuilding project. Twenty 
years on, Kosovo stands as a monument to the hubris of the promises and 
assumptions of externally-led projects of state formation. Even Kosovo’s 
‘stateness’ is in doubt, with no consensus on the recognition of its sovereignty 
among European Union members and the international community similarly 
divided. The lack of clarity over Kosovo’s status is reflected in the complex 
mixture of international powers and agencies that co-produce its structures 
and institutions. Direct protectorate powers have become indirect under the 
auspices of the European Union Stabilization and Association Agreement 
(SAA) and the European Reform Agenda (ERA) but the European Rule of 
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) still maintains some executive powers and 
the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
still play vital roles (European Commission, 2018). 
This short article reflects on the twenty years of international statebuilding, 
during which time the conception of statebuilding has been transformed from 
an idealist, liberal universal discourse to one that emphasizes pragmatic and 
realist considerations. At its inception in the late 1990s, statebuilding was 
understood as a field of temporary external policy-intervention with the 
intention of transforming post-conflict or conflict-prone territories into 
sovereign authorities, capable of governing on the basis of liberal 
constitutional frameworks, market freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. 
Today, these transformative aspirations have been drastically scaled back, 
resulting in the current stasis, as pragmatic security and managerial concerns 
have taken centre stage. 
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The international statebuilding project in Kosovo appears emblematic of a 
broader international policy shift away from the liberal universal policy 
prescriptions of the 1990s. International statebuilding is to all intents and 
purposes no longer part of the international policy agenda: discredited not so 
much on the basis of individual cases of poor implementation or planning but 
through disillusionment with its underlying universal assumptions. The 
following sections seek to trace and analyze the understandings of this shift in 
three ways: through the lenses of E H Carr’s classic work The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis; UN policy thinking on the problematic assumptions of international 
statebuilding; and the diagnoses in David Lake’s 2016 book The 
Statebuilder’s Dilemma. 
The Twenty Years’ Crisis
Set the task of analysing the twenty years’ of international statebuilding since 
the end of the Kosovo war, it is useful to reflect upon EH Carr’s classic work 
on international relations theory and inter-war history, The Twenty Years’ 
Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (Carr 
[1939] 1981). Carr’s book was originally intended to be titled ‘Utopia and 
Reality’ (Cox 2001, p. xi) (which the publishers found to be too abstract) 
indicating that the twenty years’ crisis of the title was not merely about a 
series of problems or an on-going set of issues, but rather concerned a 
secular trend, a contestation between two approaches and a shift from one 
way of thinking to another: from an idealist, utopian, abstract, morality-based 
view of liberal universalism to a more strategic, pragmatic and interest-based 
‘science’ of realism; starting from the world as it exists rather than how we 
would like it to be. The suggestion of the analysis here is that statebuilding is 
now understood as having taken a similar trajectory, starting off as a liberal 
(today most commentators would also say idealist or utopian) project and 
ending up in a ‘realist’ or pragmatist mode of resignation and disillusionment.
Carr himself had little at stake in this shift, apart from to highlight that it 
indicated the ideological nature of International Relations itself as a discrete 
body of thought, which he saw as merely a pseudo-discipline, aping other 
social sciences and designed to rationalise the exercise of power of dominant 
nations over weaker ones (Cox 2001, p. xiii). Likewise, there is little to 
celebrate in the end of liberal statebuilding as an international framework of 
problem-solving; the shift from a ‘utopia’ of externally engineered 
transformation to a ‘reality’ of pragmatism and monitoring from EU agencies 
keen to keep Kosovo at arms length (still excluded from visa liberalization and 
a long way from formal EU integration). The shift in fortunes of international 
statebuilding in Kosovo - from the exaggerated, even hubristic, demands for 
transformation to an idealised liberal model under direct management of the 
UN and NATO to today’s arms length management and mediated and indirect 
regulation through a host of often ad hoc international agencies - reflects 
broader trends of international intervention, where agencies often retreat to 
aerial drones and crowdsourced monitoring from afar (Lynch 2016; Pugliese 
2016; Duffield 2019). 
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Carr’s study started with the triumphalism of the United State’s entry into 
international politics at the Versailles peace conference following the First 
World War and he clearly had little sympathy for the moral crusading liberal 
idealism in the cause of US interests, personified by US President Woodrow 
Wilson. The inter-war period of the Twenty Years’ Crisis was the story of the 
collapse of liberal international idealism, which was dealt a major blow by the 
world economic collapse of 1929 that rekindled open inter-imperialist rivalries, 
leading rapidly to the resumption of World War. The ‘twenty years’ crisis’ of 
international statebuilding does not have the drama on the world scale of the 
interwar period but holds some similarities to Carr’s story of disappointment 
and disillusionment in liberal internationalism driven by a ‘voluntarist’ moral 
idealism in the service of power politics. The repeat of a new internationalist 
moral moment with the end of the Cold War was also short-lived and 
contested and the new ‘realism’, that is the upshot of failures of the grand 
schemes of international intervention, can equally be seen as a sterile 
deterministic ‘codification of the status quo’. 
However, there are, of course, major differences. Carr’s ‘twenty years’ crisis’ 
was driven by the breakdown of the fragile international order established with 
the League of Nations, damaged by US isolationism and the exclusion of 
major powers Germany and the Soviet Union. The auspices for success for 
international statebuilding, under a US, UN and NATO guided international 
order in the 1990s, seemed much more promising. Ironically, it was not 
international rivalries that undermined liberal interventionist dreams of 
international statebuilding as much as a crisis in the underpinning liberal 
assumptions of universality and political progress; undermined by a growing 
awareness of environmental and economic crises, complex 
interdependencies and global uncertainties. This retreat can be articulated in 
the words of Carr as ‘consistent realism’; a realism that ‘fails to provide any 
ground for purpose or meaningful action’ (Carr 1981, p. 86). The idealism of 
the 1990s may have evaporated but no positive vision has taken its place. 
The ‘Hubris’ of Liberal Statebuilding
From the position of looking back from 2019, the initial assumptions of 
international statebuilding seem to have been the product of accident, of 
hubris and of a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of peace, of 
politics and of the unintended consequences of external policy interventions. 
This did not seem to be the case in the late 1990s when the policy discourse 
of statebuilding was central to what was seen to be a new liberal international 
order, with the end of the Cold War division. In the closing years of the Cold 
War and into the early 1990s the UN began to extend post-conflict missions 
and peacekeeping mandates of ceasefire monitoring in ways which began to 
be openly political, interfering directly in civilian matters including 
constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, for example, in the UN-led 
missions deployed in Namibia, Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia and 
Mozambique (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006). 
With the end of the Cold War, there was a new sense of optimism regarding 
the international liberal order and the idea of statebuilding began to formalise 
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with the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace report of 1992. Paragraph 
17 of the report argued that while the state was the central institution: ‘The 
time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed; its theory 
was never matched by reality.’ (UN 1992) Paragraph 59 claimed, under the 
rubric of the new concept of ‘peacebuilding’, that the UN could have the 
authority to directly intervene in the political process providing ‘support for the 
transformation of deficient national structures and capabilities, and for the 
strengthening of new democratic institutions’. 
The extension of international authority to intervene in the management of 
post-conflict statebuilding was reinforced in the Secretary-General’s follow up 
position paper, the Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, in 1995. Here it was 
argued that international intervention must extend ‘beyond military and 
humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation 
and the re-establishment of effective government’ (UN 1995, Para 13). In the 
position paper, under the section headed ‘Post-Conflict Peace-Building’, for 
the first time, the UN Secretary-General envisaged the possibility of new 
forms of UN temporary protectorates with the goal of statebuilding:
In a country ruined by war, resumption of such activities may initially 
have to be entrusted to, or at least coordinated by, a multifunctional 
peace-keeping operation, but as that operation succeeds in restoring 
normal conditions, the programmes, funds, offices and agencies can re-
establish themselves and gradually take over responsibility from the peace-
keepers, with the resident coordinator in due course assuming the 
coordination functions temporarily entrusted to the special 
representative of the Secretary-General. (UN 1995, Para 53)
The stage was set for the twenty years’ of crisis the moment the Secretary-
General’s conception of statebuilding with the goal of liberal institution-
building was fully implemented for the first time, following the post-war 
elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when the temporary international mandates 
were extended and civilian control over the peacebuilding process taken over 
by international appointees in February 1997. The hubris of the late 1990s 
reached its highpoint when the UN gave its formal imprint to the international 
protectorate in Kosovo in 1999. The Western Balkans were the crucible 
through which statebuilding was developed, tested and renegotiated and the 
confidence of the late 1990s quickly waned with the over extension of the 
belief in external responsibility for overseeing post-conflict political processes 
of reconstruction with the lack of a coherent ‘exit strategy’ in the Balkans and 
then the debacles of Afghanistan and Iraq.
Today, there is an emergent consensus over what has gone wrong with 
statebuilding over the last twenty years. In both policy-making and in 
academia there has been a reappraisal of the statebuilding paradigm; one 
which has sought to rationalise and to a certain extent excuse and legitimate 
the policy errors. It appears that the lesson being learned is the lesson of 
pragmatism, that peace cannot be exported as a set of policies, institutions 
and practices. That to do so, in the words of leading US scholar David Lake, 
is ‘criminally stupid’ (2016, p. ix) or ‘astounding in its audacity’ (2016, p. 197). 
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Lake’s monograph The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign 
Intervention (published in late 2016) is a clear and representative example of 
the current acceptance of pragmatist approaches and serves here as a basis 
for discussing their implications.
Pragmatism could be understood as a ‘realist’ response to the liberal idealism 
of international statebuilding. According to Lake, the problematic is simple - 
statebuilding only came into existence as a liberal project with the end of the 
Cold War in 1990. Prior to then, the US and the Soviets were keen to support 
loyal regimes and there was no conception of statebuilding as the external 
promotion of liberal institutional frameworks. ‘Liberal statebuilding, beginning 
with the end of the Cold War, elevated the goal of building legitimate states 
and premised strategy on the belief that democracy and free markets would 
be sufficient to legitimate a government in the eyes of its people.’ (Lake 2016, 
p. 6) It is worth quoting Lake’s formulation of the problem:
The liberal model of statebuilding so widely applied in the post–Cold 
War period was not selected because it was a tried and true method. Rather, 
it was an ideology that fit an emerging academic paradigm on the 
positive role of limited political institutions that, in turn, reflected the euphoria 
of the “end of history” moment. Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, however, 
legitimacy is not inherent in institutions in general nor only in 
institutions with representative qualities. Institutions are not “strong” or 
accepted by society simply because they are institutions. This puts the 
proverbial cart before the horse… This is the mistake of nearly all 
statebuilders in recent decades, and of all institutionalist scholars, who 
have placed inordinate faith in the legitimating power of democratic 
institutions…
The arrogance behind this particular theory of politics, however, 
grew out of our own time. Given the world in 1991, as history was just 
ending, how could democracy, free markets, and limited but effective 
states not be “good things”—and why should all good things not go 
together? In the end, the model said more about the statebuilders than 
about statebuilding. (2016, p. 198)
We can see a simple inversion of liberal statebuilding understandings: 
exporting institutions and legal frameworks makes no sense and ignores the 
social basis of governing legitimacy – establishing hybrid orders where the 
state has no de facto purchase on society or further destabilising society by 
offering enrichment opportunities to elites etc. 
Here, Lake sets up the liberal statebuilding framework as an accident of the 
historical moment and liberal overconfidence in the 1990s. A policy blip that 
was always destined to fail – based as it was more on our naïve idealism than 
any understanding of the world. In the terminology of popular French social 
theorist Bruno Latour, it now appears that really ‘We Were Never Liberal 
Statebuilders’ (see Latour 1993). Statebuilding it seems was just an 
unfortunate and accidental mistake. This is both a problematic and apologetic 
or self-serving interpretation of the end of the statebuilding paradigm as will 
be considered below.
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The End of Statebuilding
In 2000, at the height of the United Nation’s confidence in the transformation 
of the international agenda, in the Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations, presented by the United Nation’s Secretary-General, 
Section A, ‘Defining the elements of peace operations’, defined the new 
concept of statebuilding in these terms, as:
…activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the 
foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those 
foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, 
[state]building includes but is not limited to reintegrating former 
combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, 
through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal 
reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, 
education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing 
technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral 
assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution 
and reconciliation techniques. (UN 2000, p. 3)
The definition was kept open with a non-inclusive list of examples of 
international statebuilding responsibilities listed, covering a wide range of 
institutional capacity-building measures covering everything from the legal 
and political system to education and health and welfare.
In 2019, statebuilding is no longer a term on the international agenda. Even 
the United Nations has shifted away from the use of this terminology. The 
UN’s shift away from statebuilding, to much more flexible and pragmatic 
approaches, stems from a rejection of the interventionist approaches 
developed and popularised in the 1990s and now seen to be based on 
‘supply-driven templates and an overly technocratic focus on capitals and 
elites’ and counterproductively increasing ‘the risk of unintentionally 
exacerbating divisions’ (UN 2015a, p. 12). In fact, the UN report of the 
advisory group of experts for the 2015 review of the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Architecture, went as far as to state that mistakes had resulted 
from no less than ‘a generalized misunderstanding of the nature of 
peacebuilding’ itself (UN 2015b, p. 7). Instead, pragmatism has increasingly 
become the order of the day with the call for ‘more realistic and contextualized 
political strategies’ (UN 2015a, p. 13). 
Statebuilding has been eased off the policy agenda on the grounds that there 
is no longer the assumption of clarity in terms of problems or solutions, as the 
UN’s High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations review stated ‘there 
is no linear path to peace’ (UN 2015a, p. 18): ‘complex linkages’ and 
interconnections between actors and intervening agencies mean that the UN 
needs less focus on ‘template mandates and missions’ and instead more 
emphasis upon fluid and flexible ‘situation-specific’ strategies (ibid, p. 23). The 
idea that external actors can either develop solutions or implement them on 
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the ground has been undermined by the reality that ‘conflicts have become 
more complex, increasingly fragmented and intractable’ (UN 2015b, p.7).
The UN no longer wants to set itself up as the external expert and manager of 
processes of transitional ‘statebuilding’ but rather seeks to increasingly situate 
itself as part of domestic processes of support and facilitation. This pragmatic 
approach, working with and through local processes:
…demands that United Nations personnel in the field engage with and 
relate to the people and communities they are asked to support. The legacy 
of the “white-SUV culture” must give way to a more human face that 
prioritizes closer interaction with local people to better understand their 
concerns, needs and aspirations. (UN 2015a, p. 30)
The UN has thus moved to distance itself from ‘statebuilding’ and towards 
stressing peace in status quo terms of sustainability and local legitimacy 
rather than as an externally-led transformation conforming to preconceived 
goals and attained through externally managed social and political 
engineering:
Peacebuilding is not State-building… Countries emerging from conflict 
are not blank pages and their people are not “projects”. They are the 
main agents of peace. However, the international approach is often 
based on generic models that ignore national realities… Efforts to sustain 
peace must build upon [local] institutions and the resilience and 
reconciliation processes of local communities, and not undermine them… 
When countries set out their priorities and they enjoy strong national 
support, they must be respected. Too often they are not. (UN 2015a, p. 48)
Statebuilding has been rejected by the UN because it has been understood to 
be too linear and too reductionist. Today it may be alleged that ‘peacebuilding’ 
is not ‘statebuilding’ but this has not always been the case and the two 
concepts seem to be intimately connected and are often used interchangeably, 
largely because the UN itself conceptualised peacebuilding as the building or 
rebuilding of states. ‘Statebuilding as peacebuilding’ made a lot of easy 
assumptions that something that was broken could be easily fixed, returning 
societies to the status quo or establishing a new one on the basis of the liberal 
institutions of democracy, the rule of law and market efficiency. The focus 
upon liberal institutional frameworks was the cornerstone of statebuilding 
conceived as a liberal internationalist project. This project is now over.
Today, the UN argues that the focus on building liberal institutions was 
mistaken for two key reasons (UN 2015b, p. 17). Firstly, that rather than 
statebuilding occurring after conflict, problems have to be engaged with along 
an ‘arc’ or continuum, from prevention to reconstruction: sustaining peace is a 
complex process not a set of discrete linear stages, calling for different 
institutional operations and sets of expertise. Second, and relatedly, 
statebuilding had implied that peace could be built according to some 
universal set of policies to be implemented, rather than through engaging in 
complex, interrelated and cross-cutting policy concerns which are always 
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going to be case specific, involving going beyond policy and expertise ‘silos’ in 
order to ‘unite the peace and security, human rights and development "pillars" 
of the UN’ (UN 2015b, p. 8). In short, the policy space of what was called 
‘statebuilding’ no longer exists as a distinct set of goals, techniques, practices 
and expertise, separate to UN activities put in a more holistic policy context of 
the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (UN 2015b, p. 57). The ‘crisis’ of 
statebuilding seems to have been resolved through the development of a new 
pragmatist consensus.
The Pragmatic Apologia
Pragmatism, as a critique of statebuilding, problematizes the idea of 
institution-building both from the ‘top-down’ and from the ‘bottom-up’. 
Pragmatic positions are critical both of the idea that international experts 
could develop institutional solutions that could just be exported or imposed by 
external actors and also of the idea that deeper social, economic or political 
external “engineering” might enable liberal institutional frameworks to work 
without frictions. These ‘liberal’ framings assume that external actors can 
shape social and political processes and outcomes on the basis that power 
works in a linear or cause-and-effect manner (i.e. that certain policy 
interventions will lead to certain desirable results or outcomes). Pragmatist 
positions tend to resist the idea that there are pre-set or pre-packaged ‘off-
the-peg’ solutions to universal or generalizable ‘problems’, instead problems 
should be grasped in their concrete and relational context. From a pragmatic 
perspective, Western interests in creating liberal democracies or ideological 
desires to spread liberal values therefore need to be tempered by a much 
greater appreciation of “realism”. 
This ‘realist turn’ inverts the international statebuilding paradigm, starting from 
the problem rather than from the Western or international provision of 
‘solutions’ or external goals. This inversion is powerfully expressed through 
the view that there is a paradox or contradiction at the heart of the 
statebuilding programme. The more there is an attempt to shape outcomes 
based on external interests or values the less likely it is to succeed: ‘…the 
greater the interests of the statebuilder in the target country, the less likely 
statebuilding is to succeed in building a legitimate state that can survive on its 
own into the indefinite future’ (Lake 2016, p. 2). The pragmatic paradox is 
interesting in that it is not just a critique of the limits and difficulties of 
exporting liberal institutions, it also suggests that to do so is inherently 
problematic, making the situation worse. Lake argues that: ‘current practice 
reveals great faith in externally led social engineering’ (2016, p. 1):
The existing literature emphasizes getting national political institutions 
“right.” This emphasis recurs both at the deep level of politics, where 
observers and practitioners identify predatory institutions as the root 
evil, and at the surface, where analysts debate the proper strategy and 
tactics of statebuilding. This concentration on institutions implicitly accepts 
and is premised on a particular theory of state legitimation, one grounded in 
liberalism. Institutions are, no doubt, important. But in this focus the 
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underlying social cleavages that undermine institutions and ultimately 
bring down states are ignored. (2016, p. 11)
In this, now consensual, critique, Lake echoes the current perspective of the 
UN, cited at the opening of this article, against the idea that external 
preferences or blueprints could be exported or imposed. The UN describes 
this externally-led or ‘top-down’ approach as a ‘template’ culture or the ‘the 
so-called “Christmas tree mandate” dilemma, where template language for 
many tasks routinely appears in mission mandates’ (UN 2015a, p. 60). The 
pragmatic paradox appears to be that the more ‘enthusiastic’ reformers are to 
transform other societies the more they risk unintentional consequences, 
which could be counterproductive. The pragmatic lesson is that ‘less can 
sometimes be more’: that peace can not in fact be built by good intentions of 
external do-gooders but needs to be understood in more ‘local’ and ‘organic’ 
ways. This shift towards the ‘pragmatic’ or the ‘organic’ is also prefigured in 
more critical policy and academic work which suggests that statebuilding is a 
complex organic process of self-organising adaptation and resilience. For 
example, Cedric de Coning, a leading policy analyst, concludes that:
…when international peace interventions try to engineer specific 
outcomes, they produce the opposite effect of that which sustaining peace 
aims to achieve; they generate on-going instability, dependence and 
fragility, because such interventions undermine self-organisation and 
thus resilience. A complexity-informed approach to self-sustainable 
peace suggests that peacebuilders limit their efforts to safeguarding, 
stimulating, facilitating and creating the space for societies to develop 
resilient capacities for self- organisation. (de Coning 2016, p. 167)
Thus, the pragmatic alternative seeks to move away from external or 
universal goals and looks for more ‘organic’ metrics that could serve as a 
guide instead, such as local ‘legitimacy’, starting with the existing social and 
political order rather than ‘universal’ views of desirable liberal institutional 
frameworks. It is important to focus on how the actually existing society works, 
rather than Western ideals. Pragmatism works with what there is rather than 
imposing liberal goals and aspirations. As Lake states:
My approach differs from the prevailing institutionalist view… 
institutionalists are fundamentally liberals, in the classic sense of this 
term, who believe the legitimacy of the state follows from democracy 
and free markets…. [T]his liberal model of statebuilding is itself deeply 
flawed and has repeatedly failed to provide the legitimacy necessary 
for successful statebuilding… legitimacy follows from social order, not 
the other way around as in the prevailing model. (2016, p. 17)
For this doyen of US policy-making academia, the pragmatist framing thus 
neatly inverts the ‘top-down’ and ‘liberal’ paradigm of international 
statebuilding. In what is now the established consensus on the death of the 
statebuilding moment, it is suggested that intervention guided by liberal 
universalist understandings could only make conflict situations worse (see, for 
example, Etzione 2016).
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Despite the fact that existing conditions are far from ideal, the new consensus 
seems to be that, no matter how bad things are, international statebuilding 
interventions will fail to make a positive difference. Both policy-makers and 
radical critics increasingly agree that accepting the status quo can often be 
better than attempts at any positive transformation. Thus disillusionment with 
international intervention has been given coherence and even a positive spin 
by pragmatic and ‘organic’ approaches, which have strongly reinforced the 
potentially dangerous and self-satisfying understanding that ‘they’ are not 
ready for liberalism (see Chandler 2015a; 2015b). Thus even radical critiques 
of Western hubris and liberal certitude have been played out against the 
backdrop of ‘their’ unsuitability for modern liberal frameworks of governance. 
The error of Western policymakers then becomes merely that of naivety and 
over confidence in ‘their’ capacities and abilities to be like ‘us’. This definitely 
softens the ‘critical’ blow and enables pragmatic approaches to salve Western 
policy consciences. Today it appears that the real ‘crime’ of international 
statebuilders is that of caring too much. As Lake put it: ‘The limits of external 
statebuilding are reached precisely when the statebuilder cares the most 
about the future policies of the failed state.’ (2016, p. 16) ‘Caring too much’ 
implies that statebuilders want to go too far and too quickly, in essence, 
attempting to short cut the ‘organic’ process of building sustainable peace. 
The Return of Realism  
The pragmatist critique of international statebuilding goals leaves three 
general policy options. Lake sets up the first option as that advocated by 
Stephen Krasner, of ‘good enough governance’, where the international 
community enforces a minimal set of rights standards and key international 
security threats are dealt with and stability was seen as more important than 
democracy (2016, p. 201). This perspective could be seen as pragmatism in 
its everyday usage and as a return to Cold War clientelist regimes:
This is the direction in which US policy, at least since Iraq, has been 
trending under President Obama: target individual terrorists and 
organizations but avoid large-scale interventions, even into such clearly 
failed states as Libya, and tolerate authoritarian leaders who promise 
stability, as with the military in Egypt after the coup against President 
Mohamed Morsi. (Lake 2016, p. 202)
The second option is that of a ‘neutral’ statebuilding intervention (2016, p. 
203) where concern is focused on building up organic processes of social 
formation. Interestingly, Lake suggests that this is a highly unlikely possibility 
as, even if there could be any ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ ideal solution, a multi-
lateral framework would still rely on ‘interested’ states, which would pervert 
any process to their own ends or would attract little international support 
(2016, p. 204). The ‘organic’ option, of working with the resources and 
capacities available rather than seeking to direct and shape policy processes, 
similarly takes statebuilding off the policy agenda, making statebuilding a 
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marginal preoccupation of non-governmental agencies, concerned with 
community development and social welfare.
Lake’s preference is for the third option, which involves little direct 
international intervention, instead focusing on providing indirect institutional 
incentives while enabling a discursive framing of self-government and 
decision-making autonomy fro the target state:
…focus instead on creating an international environment conducive to 
indigenous state formation. Through the use of carrots and sticks, 
states might shape incentives for fragile states by making access to the 
security and economic benefits of the Pax Americana, in general, or 
the European Union, in particular, contingent on domestic groups 
settling their differences, agreeing on a social order, and governing 
themselves effectively. (2016, p. 21)
It is noticeable that the only option of the three with the goal of supporting 
liberal statebuilding goals, formally the sine qua non of the statebuilding 
project, is one that does not involve any direct policy intervention in the states 
and societies concerned but rather governance from a distance. The two 
options that could be seen to be involved in domestic political processes only 
operated at the margins, either with a concern with international security 
threats and instability or with building community capacities: neither of these 
approaches aims at supporting liberal institutional frameworks of markets, 
democracy, rights and the rule of law. 
Conclusion
Perhaps in considering the shifting nature of statebuilding over the last twenty 
years in Kosovo, all three of these pragmatic options can be seen to be in 
effect. Clientelist security concerns are evident in the NATO’s KFOR presence 
of around 4,000 troops in two regional bases - Camp Bondsteel and Camp 
Villagio Italia – headquartered in in Camp Film City, Pristina. NGO-led social 
or ‘neutral’ capacity-building takes place via international donor funding 
across the social sector, often coordinated between the European Union 
Office in Kosovo with major development agencies. While the key pragmatic 
mechanism is the arms length programme of ‘indigenous state formation’ 
through the ‘carrots and sticks’ of the long and complex provisions and 
processes of the European Union Stabilization and Association Agreement. In 
the turn to realist and pragmatist understandings, statebuilding as a major 
paradigm of international policy-making is doubly erased: firstly, in being 
reinterpreted as a momentary accident or misunderstanding; and, secondly, in 
discussions of alternatives that maintain little of the ambitious and 
transformative aspiration of previous doctrines.
References
Carr, E. H. 1981. The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the 
Study of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
16
Chandler, D. 2015a. ‘Reconceptualising International Intervention: 
Statebuilding, ‘Organic Processes’ and the Limits of Causal Knowledge’, 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 9(1) 70-88.
Chandler, D. 2015b. ‘Resilience and the “Everyday”: Beyond the Paradox of 
“Liberal Peace”, Review of International Studies 41(1) 27-48.
Cox, M. 2001. ‘Introduction’ in EH Carr, The Twenty Year’s Crisis 1919-1939: 
An Introduction to the Study of International Relations. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
De Coning, C. 2016. ‘From peacebuilding to sustaining peace: Implications of 
complexity for resilience and sustainability’, Resilience: International Policies, 
Practices and Discourses 4 (3) 166-181.
Doyle, M. and Sambanis, N. 2006. Making War and Building Peace: United 
Nations Peace Operations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Duffield, M. 2019. Post-Humanitarianism: Governing Precarity in the Digital 
World. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Etzione, A. 2016. “Back to Nation Building?” Huffington Post, 30 March 2016. 
Available at: https://www.huffingtonpost.com/amitai-etzioni/back-to-nation-
building_b_9576390.html   
European Commission. 2018. Kosovo 2018 Report: Commission Staff 
Working Document. COM(2018)450 final. Strasbourg: European Commission.
Lake, D. 2016. The Statebuilder’s Dilemma: On the Limits of Foreign 
Intervention. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Latour, B. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press.
Lynch, C. 2016. “How to Crowdsource the Syrian Cease-Fire,” Foreign Policy, 
23 March.
Pugliese, D. 2016. “Traditional peace-keeping not enough to maintain a 
Syrian deal: UN report looks to satellites, crowdsourcing,” National Post, 9 
February. 
United Nations. 1992. An Agenda for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant 
to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 
31 January 1992. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 1995. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace:  Position Paper of 
the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 2000. Brahimi Report, Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations, United Nations General Assembly Security Council, 21 
August. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 2015a. Uniting our Strengths for Peace: Politics, Partnership 
and People, Report of the high-level independent panel on United Nations 
peace operations. New York: United Nations.
United Nations. 2015b. The Challenge of Sustaining Peace, Report of the 
Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the United Nations 
Peacebuilding Architecture. New York: United Nations.
